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THE EVACUATION OF JAPANESE-A1vTERICANS FROM WASHINGTON STATE
DURING WORLD WAR II:

A STUDY IN RACE DISCRIMINATION

In 1964 Congress passed a major civil rights bill
designed to give equal rights to all Americans regardless of
race, but there was a time when that same government under
pressures of war, denied civil rights to citizens as well as
non-citizens strictly because of race.

Going back twenty-

three years, one can study the racial discrimination practiced
by the United States government towards another minority
group--the Japanese-Americans.

This paper will cover:

(1) Why the Japanese-Americans were evacuated during World
War II; (2) How they were evacuated; (J) The consequences of
their evacuation.

Because of the vast program of relocation

of all the Japanese-Americans on the Pacific Coast, this
study will be limited to the 14,565 Japanese-Americans of
Washington State.

CHAPTER I
WHY THE JAPANESE-AMERICANS WERE EVACUATED
Background
When Commodore Matthew C. Perry entered the Bay of
Yedo in 1854 "he thought that he was merely opening Japan to
American commerce, but he actually opened America to Japanese
labor.tr (10:3}

Chinese laborers were prohibited from enter-

ing the United States in 1882 when the Chinese Exclusion Act
was passed, yet American businesses needed cheap labor so
they encouraged Japanese laborers to immigrate.

The number

of Japanese in the United States jumped from 184 in 1880 to
24,000 in 1900.

But in 1907 the United States and Japan

signed a treaty restricting Japanese immigration to only 185
per year, and finally in 1924, Congress barred all Japanese
immigrants.

"Originally, they came to this country to acquire

wealth and return to their native country." (10:3)

But after

living here, raising their children here, "they chose not to
return to their 'Fatherland of birth,' but elected to cherish
the privilege of living permanently in their 'Motherland of
dreams.'" (10 :3)
According to the 1940 census, there were about 127,000
persons of Japanese ancestry in the continental United States
which represented less than one per cent of the total United
States population.

Over 47,000 of the resident Japanese had

been born in Japan and about 98 per cent of them had entered
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the country prior to the Oriental Exclusion Act of 1924 and
almost one half of the total arrived before 1910.

"With

numerically unimportant exceptions, they were ineligible to
American citizenship." (40:1)

However, Congress passed an

act in June 1935 making aliens eligible for citizenship if
(1) they had served in the United States armed forces during
World War I and had been honorably discharged: and (2) if
they were permanent residents of the United States.

Only a

small number of Japanese obtained citizenship under this act
before it expired on January 1, 1937. (40:1)
Of the 127,000 Japanese in the United States, over 90
per cent or about 113,000 lived in the four Western states of
Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington.

In Washington

there were 14,565 persons of Japanese ancestry in 1941.

Most

of these people, 11,913, lived in King and Pierce counties.
Nearly two-thirds of the Japanese in the state had been born
in this country and were automatically American citizens.
Thus, only 5,683 were aliens or foreign born Japanese.

(For

future reference, the following terms will be used to distinguish between the different groups of Japanese aliens and
the Japanese-Americans:

The word "Issei" will refer to the

first generation immigrants from Japan.

The Japanese children

born in the United States will be called "Nisei.")

In the

United States in 1940 most of the Issei were old, over 50 per
cent of them being over 50 years of age, with 17 per cent
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being over 60 and only eight per cent under 35.

By contrast,

the Nisei were characterized by their youth with over 66 per
cent being under the age of 20 and less than three per cent
being over 3 5.

In Washington State, out of the 14, 565

Japanese, 8,882 were Nisei and 5,683 were Issei.
Causes for Action
With the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan on
December 7, 1941, the American people as a whole were confused and uneasy.

The apparent success of the Japanese enemy

in the Pacific exposed the entire Pacific Coast to possible
attack.

Wild rumors spread about a Japanese fifth column in

Hawaii that had helped the Pearl Harbor attack.

Secretary of

the Navy Frank Knox clouded the truth when he said at a press
conference in Washington, D. C., on December 15 that the "most
effective fifth-column work of the entire war was done in
Hawaii, with the possible exception of Norway." (42:10)
Apparently "what Secretary Knox actually had in mind, it now
seems clear from all the available evidence, was that espionage
activity was carried out by agents in the Japanese consulate
in Honolulu and perhaps, to some extent, by special emissaries
who had quite recently come into the territory from the
Japanese home islands." (42:10)

Unfortunately, the Secretary

of the Navy did not say this at that time and left the public
to its own interpretation of his remarks.

Almost immediately
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a government official took exception to Secretary Knox's
choice of words.

Curtis B. Munson had made a government sur-

vey of the loyalty of resident Japanese both in Hawaii and
on the West coast in November 1941.

According to his find-

ings the resident Japanese were loyal to the United States
and the Nisei were completely Americanized.

About Knox's

term "fifth-column" he said, "Fifth-column activities, such
as in Norway, impugns the loyalty of a certain large percentage of a population." (42:11)

Honolulu officials also seemed

to discredit Knox's insinuations.

The chief of police, the

chief of military intelligence, and the special agent in
charge of the FBI office in Honolulu all denied that there
was any sabotage by Japanese or Japanese-American residents
of the territory. (42:10)

However, several other simultaneous

and unrelated developments seemed to strengthen Knox's statement:

(1) continuing reports of enemy submarine activity off

the West coast; (2) the unfounded rumors of resident Japanese
sabotage at Pearl Harbor which were spread on the mainland
by women and children evacuees from Honolulu. (42:11)

(3) reports circulating of signal lights being visible along
the West coast and the interception of unidentified radio
transmissions; (4) government reports of spot raids which
revealed hidden quantities of contraband such as guns, rifles,
ammunition, and maps.

(The government failed to point out

that much of this contraband was legal to possess in peace
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time and that a large number of guns and rifles and anununition collected was taken from Nisei-owned sporting goods
stores, while the maps were nothing more than what any citizen or alien might have in the glove compartment of his
car. ( 24: 262)
In Hawaii, where the population was predominently of
Japanese ancestry, the Issei and Nisei became part of the
war effort without any hesitation and they had the support
of officials who quickly denied that there was any disloyalty by these people. (24:266)

However, in Washington State

as elsewhere on the West Coast, a minority of outspoken,
white American citizens began to wonder, question, and
finally to demand the evacuation of all the Japanese residents.

They and the government used the term "Japanese" to

include both lssei and Nisei. (43:9)

The Bremerton American

Legon Post No. 149 stated that it was impossible to segregate loyal from disloyal Japanese and that the security of
the United States was in jeopardy as long as any Japanese
were within the coastal area.

Their resolution said in part

that the "recent attack upon Pearl Harbor was a glaring
example of Japanese trickery and indictive of the disastrous
results that may be obtained by fifth-column activities
operating in conjunction with the enemy from without." (17:7)
An editorial in a daily Seattle paper implied that the
Japanese should prove their loyalty.

Part of the editorial
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stated:
Apparently the department of justice is not entirely
satisfied with the present situation upon the
Pacific Coast. Whether the measures already taken
affecting Japanese will meet all requirements for
national safety is still to be determined. There
is still opportunity for the residents of the
Japanese community to demonstrate their loyalty.
And if sterner measures are to be taken later they
should be carried out without rancor and with full
recognition that some hardships necessarily will
be inflicted upon those who do not deserve them.

(1$:$)

Some letters to the editor of a daily Seattle newspaper also
show the high degree of anti-Japanese feeling.

One man wrote:

No citizen can hold a dual allegiance and be a loyal
American. I mean Japs and Japs only, for the Italians
and Germans are few and far between who are not here
in good faith and the few exceptions can easily be
brought to book.
I personally know a Jap who is to all indications a big shot among his kind who, when his son
completed high school, whisked him off to Japland
{Si£/ to enter college. Anyone suggesting that
Papa Jap is a trustworthy American resident and
entitled to be free, at large and conducting a
business under the same protection as other people
is just putting up an argument that won't add up
for me.
Herd them up, ship them to labor camps and when
we have finished slaughtering their progenitors in
the old country then herd them up again and send
them all back. (17:10)
Even after a period of three years the idea of disloyal resident Japanese was present as evidenced by this letter to a
Seattle paper:
I would like to ask one question. Do you remember
December 7? If so, you'll agree that appearances
deceive. Especially Japanese appearances.
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I think this also applies to our so called
Japanese-Americans. Pearl Harbor could not have
been successful without a tremendous amount of help
from here. Who gave it to them? The Japs are a
menace to our standard of living and to our safety.

(23:12)

Many questions were raised in the minds of suspicious
Washingtonians:

Why did the Japanese live mostly in the area

west of the Cascades?

Why were the largest concentrations in

Seattle, Tacoma, and Olympia areas?

Why were the heaviest

concentration of these Japanese people between Seattle and
Tacoma in the Green River and Puyallup River valleys?

After

all, Boeing Airplane Company was located in the Green River
Valley.

Why did these people operate vegetable markets along

the Seattle and Tacoma waterfronts and farm near the
Bremerton Navy Yard?

Why were they engaged in fishing along

the Pacific Coast and near the Columbia River1

Why were

these Japanese located near the forests of our state?

It

looked on the surface to a small but loud and vicious minority
that these Japanese people had settled in these regions only
to plan and carry out sabotage so that Japan could conquer
the area.
However, on closer examination, it should have been
clear that the Japanese settled along the river valleys and
near the large cities only to carry out their work of truck
farming.

They set up their markets in areas, not because

they wanted to be near the waterfronts or near the navy yards
but to be located in the middle of the cities and close to
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markets.

Other Japanese were fishermen and their logical

place was on or near the ocean and major rivers.

Noreover,

some had settled in these areas before industry had moved to
the suburbs.

For example, Boeing Airplane Company in Renton

was built on farmland at the start of World War II, and naturally there would be Japanese in the vicinity.
Prejudice or discrimination against the Japanese was
not new.

Prior to World War II, and even today, aliens were

forbidden to own land in some of the Western states, including the state of Washington.

The parents of Nisei were

denied by the law the right of citizenship.

In many

Washington cities residential choice was limited by covenants
in real estate contracts.

Intermarriage with Caucasians was

forbidden in most Western states.
With the arrival of the war, discrimination increased.
All Japanese were prohibited from travel on any public carrier.

"As early as December 8, the status of Nisei as

American citizens was disregarded in favor of their status
as descendants of the Japanese enemy." (40:6)

Some Japanese,

aliens and citizens, were stopped and questioned by authorities.

Heads of Japanese associations, societies, and schools

as well as owners of import-export businesses were picked up,
detained without charge by the FBI, and taken to Immigration
Headquarters in Seattle.

The treasurer of the Tacoma

Japanese Association, Shuichi Fukui, a World War I veteran
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and citizen of the United States, was one of those picked up
and taken to Seattle.

He was held for a period of two weeks

and then released as were the other Japanese who were citizens
of the United States.

The alien Japanese who had held impor-

tant positions were held and finally sent to a special enemy
alien camp at !Vli.ssoula, Montana, for the duration of the
war. (4:-)

Meanwhile, others at home were losing their jobs

and being evicted from their homes.

Some grocers refused to

sell them food, and milk deliveries also stoped "because of
a mistaken notion that this would constitute trading with the
enemy." (24:261}

At a small flower, fruit, and produce market

operated in downtown Tacoma by Jack and Sarah Sugimoto,
former customers would stop by and speak but only about half
would make any purchases.

Towards the end of January when it

looked like all Japanese would be evacuated the owner of the
market told the Sugimotos that someone else wanted their
prime market location and they must be out of business in
four days. (27:-)

When all alien funds were frozen in

December, many families had only what money they happened to
have in their pockets.

Without cash, the utilities were shut

off and credit cancelled.
To further complicate the situation, on February 5,
1942, Congressman Martin Dies of Texas, chairman of a special
committee on Un-American Activities, claimed to have evidence
that the Japanese would attempt to land on both coasts at the
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same time and that the Japanese-Americans in Hawaii had aided
the enemy on December 7. (24:262)

Another committee in the

House of Representatives known as the Select Committee
Investigating National Defense Migration (commonly called the
Tolan Committee after its chairman, John H. Tolan of
California) held hearings which began on February 21.

Its

purpose was to investigate possible solutions to the
"Japanese problem" on the West Coast.

Hearings began in San

Francisco and continued in Seattle, Portland, Los Angeles,
and lasted about one month.

These hearings provided a stage

for all anti-Oriental groups such as the Native Sons of the
Golden West, the Associated Farmers, and the Joint Immigration Committee, all of which testified before this committee
and urged the complete evacuation of all Japanese from the
West Coast for the duration of the war.
At the Tolan hearings in Seattle on February 28,
Governor Arthur B. Langlie, who had been pursuing a moderate
course, said:
Every precaution should be made to be humane and
American in this task, but the people feel this is
no time to worry about hurting feelings. Safety is
the prime factor--safety of production and safety
of the people. (29:1)
Two strong advocates of evacuation were the state
attorney-general and the mayor of Seattle.

The Attorney

General, Smith Troy, told the committee the danger of vigilantism "had caused him most concern.

The prosecuting
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attorneys of the thirty-nine counties in the state had reported that the danger of mob violence was growing.

A disas-

ter at the battle fronts might result in outbreaks of violence. II

(

5: 109)

r•Iayor Earl

r'~illikin

of Seattle said,

the American-born are some of the most disloyal.

!!

Among

We can't

afford to take chances by leaving one whose loyalty is
questionable." (29:1)

The only elected local official to

oppose mass evacuation was J'.1ayor Harry P. Cain of Tacoma.

He

told the Tolan Committee that he favored selective instead of
mass evacuation because the Japanese operated farm produce
businesses worth $1,000,000 per year in the Puyallup Valley
and accounted for about 39 per cent of the farm land in
Pierce County. (29:1)

The manager of the Washington Produce

Shippers' Association, Floyd Oles, said he felt the Japanese
could be "settled on the soil and guarded by the army and the
FBI, with an armed guard, if necessary, at every third fence
post." (29:1)

When Fred Fueker, department adjutant of the

state organization of the American Legion, testified, he
took a more liberal stand than had a large majority of the
individual Legion posts.

Fueker said that among the Nisei

"any number of them are real Americans and that, therefore,
an attempt should be made to evacuate citizens on a selective basis.

If segregation were impossible, citizens and

aliens alike should be evacuated. 11

(

5: 43)

'1 he
1

Seattle

Downtown Kiwanis Club formally asked that all "enemy aliens
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and all Japanese • • • forthwith be removed from the Pacific
Slope." (5:55)

Two other organizations, the Lake Washington

Business Men's Association and the Eastern Washington Beet
Growers association, also testified and urged evacuation.
When the Tolan Report was issued in Jv,ay, it stated that no
sabotage had taken place.

However, it was too late to be

of importance, for two months earlier, General DeWitt, head
of the Western Defense Command, had announced that all
Japanese would be evacuated from coastal areas.
During the early months of 1942, Congressmen were
advocating action by the federal government.

In February the

West Coast Congressional delegations (except Senator Johnson
and Congressman Lea of California) formed two committees:
(1) the Committee of Alien Nationality and Sabotage headed by
Senator Iv.onrad C. Wallgren of Washington State, whose purpose
was to see that adequate internal protection against sabotage
was taken; and (2) the Committee on Defense headed by Senator
Holman of Oregon, whose purpose was to see to the adequate
defense of the Pacific Coast.

Their joint final action came

on February 13th when, in a letter to President Roosevelt,
they urged evacuation of all Japanese. (5:71)

During this

time Senator Wallgren received letters from his constituents
in Washington State demanding evacuation.

Organizations such

as the American Legion, the Grange, seven Chamber of Commerce
groups, the Kiwanis, the Lions, the Shriners, and nine trade
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unions demanded evacuation. (5:218)

Congressman John Coffee

of Washington was an adherent of moderate action even though
he later went along with his colleagues.

He said:

It is my fervent hope and prayer that residents of
the United States of Japanese extraction will not
be made victims of programs directed by selfproclaimed patriots and by hysterical self-anointed
heroes • • • • As one who has lived as a neighbor
to Japanese-Americans, I have found these people,
on the whole, to be law-abiding, industrial and
unobstrusive. Let us not make a mockery of our
Bill of Rights by mistreating these folks. Let us
rather regard them with understanding, remembering
they are victims of a Japanese war machine,
with the making of international policies of which
they had nothing to do. (5:62)
Even though three months had passed since Pearl Harbor
and no case of sabotage was discovered on the West Coast, the
public, or at least a portion of it, continued to demand
evacuation of all coastal areas. (5:262-5)

The Sixth District

of the American Legion urged the Federal Government to lock
up all Japanese for the duration of the war and to deport
them after the war.

The Native Sons of the Golden West in

California raised funds to try to cancel the citizenship
rights of Americans of Japanese ancestry. 1
The field of communications, both radio and newspapers,

l"This last-mentioned report is worth pausing over.
An organized group of our fellow-citizens is asking that
another group of our fellow-citizens, distinguished solely
by their descent from persons of a certain race be deprived
of their citizenship rights. This time this is being advocated not in Nazi Germany but in California, U. S. A~ (15:153)
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was also a source of prejudice against the Japanese-Americans
in the early part of 1942.

On February 12, 1942, Walter

Lippman implied in a column written from the West Coast that
sabotage had occurred in Hawaii and was likely to happen on
the West Coast when the right moment came.
The Pacific Coast is in imminent danger of a
combined attack from within and from without.
This is a sober statement of the situation, in fact,
a report based not on speculation but on what is
known to have taken place and to be taking place in
this area of the war. It is the fact that the
Japanese navy has been reconnoitering the Pacific
Coast more or less continually and for a considerable period of time, testing and feeling out the
American defenses. It is the fact that communication takes place between the enemy at sea and enemy
agents on land. These are the facts which we shall
ignore or minimize at our own peril. It is also
the fact that since the outbreak of the Japanese
war there has been no important sabotage on the
Pacific coast. From what we know about Hawaii and
about the fifth-column in Europe, this is not, as
some have liked to think, a sign that there is nothing to be feared. It is a sign that the blow is
well organized and that it is held back until it
can be struck with maximum effect.
I am sure I
understand fully and appreciate thoroughly the unwillingness of Washington to adopt a policy of mass
evacuation and internment of all those who are
technically enemy aliens. But I submit that
Washington is not defining the problem on the Pacific
coast correctly.
The Pacific coast is officially
a combat zone; some part of it may at any moment be
a battlefield. Nobody's constitutional rights include the right to reside and do business on a
battlefield. And nobody ought to be on a battlefield who has no good reason for being there. (42:12)

***

***

***

Henry McLemore in the San Francisco Examiner and Westbrook
Pegler in the Seattle Post Intelligencer, both nationally
known writers, in their respective columns made bitter attacks
against the Japanese and urged their removal.

John B. Hughes
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on the :Mutual Broadcasting Company conducted a bitter antiJapanese campaign on the radio. (40:17)
However, not all Americans approved of this racial discrimination and many spoke out against any mass evacuation as
an infringement of civil rights.

John Dewey and Harry Emerson

Fosdick were among hundreds that wrote the President and
urged non-evacuation of all Japanese.

Congressman Tolan,

after all his hearings were held and with the facts known,
opposed the evacuation, as did Louis Goldblatt of the
California State Industrial Union Council (CIO).
Thomas, after action had been taken, wrote:

Norman

"No possible

danger of sabotage could so menace our cause as has the
Japanese propaganda in Asia describing our treatment of
Asiatics, apparently less guilty of actual sabotage than
German agents." (41:95}
Among the groups that opposed mass evacuation of all
Japanese were the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, the American Association of University Women,
the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, the Civil
Liberties Union, the National Council of Jewish Women, Family
Welfare Association of America, the Socialist Party, the YT-·1CA i
and the YWCA.

The Tacoma News Tribune in an editorial on

harch 6, 1942, urged great care and caution to safe guard
justice for the alien Japanese if they were evacuated.
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While most of those who have been urging the evacuation of aliens from this district have been motivated solely by patriotic ideals, it is known that
there have been a few who are using patriotism as
a cloak and who have their eyes on fertile fields
or business property which they hope to acquire for
below real value.
Such a procedure would savor too much of the
practices and policies to those with whom we are at
war. We want no forced sales of valuable alien
property to favored individuals at prices far below
real values, such as occurred during the First World
War.
Here is a situation which the public should watch.
War is no excuse to permit avaricious individuals
to steal the property of ousted aliens. Such procedure would be a blot on the good name of this
state. We must see that justice is done in this
important matter and that the greedy and unscruplous
do not seize the opportunity to make big personal
profit • (3 0: 16)
Later when mass evacuation of all Japanese was announced
by the government, the News Tribune in an editorial on March 27,
1942, compared this to two other mass evacuations in North
American history:

the Acadians of Nova Scotia and the

Loyalists or Tories of the new United States. (33:18)
Federal Action
Action by the federal government began on December 8,
1941, when President Roosevelt asked Congress for a declaration of war.

At first, the domestic war restrictions applied

only to enemy aliens, which followed the precedent of World
War I.

However,
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almost all immigrants of Japanese origin were,
because of their ineligibility to citizenship,
automatically classified as enemy aliens, a situation in sharp contrast with that facing immigrants
from the two other enemy nations, Italy and Germany,
a large proportion of whom had become naturalized
American citizens and were thus exempt from the
enemy-alien classification. (40:5)
These restrictions included travel, possession of contraband
items, possible exclusion from military zones, and internment
of any alien that might be dangerous to the national security.
Attorney General of the United States was in charge of carrying out the terms of the proclamation.

However, he was

relieved of his duties when on February 19 the President
issued an Executive Order authorizing the Secretary of War
to prescribe military areas from which he and military commanders may exclude any or all persons.
restricted areas were set up:

Two categories of

(1) Category A.

Areas through

or within which no alien enemies may be permitted under any
circumstances; (2) Category B.

Areas through or within which

alien enemies may be permitted on pass or permit. (43:20)
The Western part of the United States was under the protection of the Western Defense Command headed by General John L.
DeWitt who, in 1943, told a Congressional Committee that ''A
Jap's a Jap.

It makes no difference whether he is an American

citizen or not." (24:276)

This was the man who would be

responsible for the complete evacuation of all "Japanesen
from the West Coast because of nmilitary necessity.n
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The Western Defense Command classified the population
under its control into six classes:
Class 2.
and 4.
citizen

Class 1.

Japanese aliens.

American citizens of Japanese ancestry.
German and Italian aliens.

Class 5.

Class 3

Any person,

or alien, who was suspected of being actually or

potentially dangerous.

Class 6.

All other persons. (24:28)

The alien enemy control coordinator and chief of General
DeWitt's civilian staff was Tom C. Clark.
On March 2 General DeWitt issued Proclamation No. 1,
which set up r·1ili tary Area No. 1 from which any or all persons
could be excluded.

For the first time the official press

releases made it clear that all Japanese were liable to be
evacuated. (2:146)

The following headline appeared in the

Tacoma News Tribune on March 3, 1942:

"City, Coast Barred

to Japanese." The Wartime Civilian Control Administration
was then created by General DeWitt to help encourage voluntary evacuation of Ivdlitary Area No. 1, which in Washington
included the area from the eastern base of the Cascade
hountains westward to the ocean.
Oregon and California.

It also included Western

Proclamation No. 2 was issued by

DeWitt on IvLarch 16, which extended the alien control program
to include Idaho, TJlontana, Nevada and Utah.

When voluntary

evacuation did not work well enough, General DeWitt asked
that a new agency be set up to try to correct this problem.
On Karch 18 Preisdent Roosevelt created the War Relocation
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Authority by Executive Order.

Its duty was to relocate the

Japanese in new areas, provide for their needs, and to supervise their activities.

Milton S. Eisenhower, assistant secre-

tary of agriculture, was appointed as director, but served
only until June 17 when Dillon S. Myer was appointed to
replace him.

The first compulsory evacuation of an area in

the United States took place on

l'~arch

24 when General DeWitt

issued Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1.

This affected all

persons of Japanese ancestry living on Bainbridge Island,
Washington, which lay in a north-south direction on western
Puget Sound and could provide easy access to ships that must
pass by going to the Bremerton Naval Ship Yards.

On March

29, General DeWitt ordered all voluntary evacuation by
Japanese in

~ilitary

Area No. 1 to stop.

(The process of

voluntary evacuation will be further explained in Chapter II.)
By June 1, 1942, the compulsory evacuation of Japanese from
Ivdli tary Area No. 1 to assembly or re lo ca ti on centers was
practically complete.
The reasons given for this compulsory evacuation were
summed up in the phrase, "military necessity.n (15:149)

The

western portion of Washington State fell under this "military
necessity" because it was dominated by waterways, forests,
vital installation of industry, military and naval bases, an
airplane factory, and shipyards.

The fact that so many persons

of Japanese ancestry were concentrated in the Puget Sound was
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was reviewed as a threat to military security.

Seattle, the

principal port in the Northwest; Deception Pass Bridge, the
only means by land to the naval base on Whidby Island; and
the forests which help to produce a large bulk of the sawed
lumber in the United States, must be protected.

The distance

between inhabited areas on the coast of Washington was too
great to constantly check; thus, it seemed like the only
course open to the military was total evacuation. (43:15)

By

June 7, 1942, some 9$ exclusion orders later, the Japanese
from Military Area No. 1 were concentrated in specific
centers.

"The idealogy of racism had finally prevailed over

the doctrine that Americanism was not a racial matter and
that all citizens were equal before the law." (24:277)

CHAPTER II
HOW THE JAPANESE-AMERICANS WERE EVACUATED
Voluntary Evacuation
Even before Public Proclamation No. 1 was issued in
1V1arch, some voluntary evacuation had begun when about 9, 000
Issei and Nisei moved to the eastern parts of the coastal
states, including 499 men and women who voluntarily moved in
Washington State.

Some Nisei bought land and planted crops,

but they eventually were forced to move to assembly centers
before they could harvest.

General DeWitt urged this volun-

tary evacuation program as did the Fourth Army which was in
charge of the Western Defense Command.

When the Wartime

Civil Control Administration was created, 48 regional offices
were set up in each important center of Japanese population
in the West Coast area, the first civil control station being
opened at Winslow, Washington, on Iv1arch 24.

Their primary

job was to encourage voluntary evacuation.

The offices were

staffed by representatives of the Federal Reserve Bank, to
handle business and personal property; the Farm Security
Administration, to handle all agricultural property; and the
Federal Security Agency, to provide all necessary social
services needed.

"After these were started, specific plans

for {compulsory) evacuation of Japanese from
No. 1 were immediately initiated." (43:41)
not evident to all Japanese, however.)

~tilitary

Area

{These plans were

Since some major
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economic and social problems developed from this voluntary
evacuation, the President, by Executive Order, established the
War Relocation Authority on March 18 with Milton S. Eisenhower as the director.

Its functions were to supervise, to

provide employment, and to resettle displaced evacuees.

WRA

had broad discretionary powers with only two limitations:
It could not start further evacuation and it had no power to
return evacuees to their original areas. (40:24)

Prospective

voluntary evacuees were urged to prepare for evacuation and
were promised aid in moving with the government paying the
cost of transportation to the interior and helping to find
specific employment.

However, the attitude of the interior

states was hostile and showed that the evacuees were not
welcomed.

The fears that the Japanese voiced were clearly

shown in a statement given to the Tolan Committee by Emergency Defense Council, Seattle Chapter of the JapaneseAmerican League in Seattle:
A large number of people have remarked that
they will go where the government orders them to
go willingly, if it will help the national defense
effort. But the biggest problem in their minds
is where to go. The first unofficial evacuation
announcement pointed out that the government did
not concern itself with where evacuees went, just
so they left prohibited areas. Obviously, this
was no solution to the question, for immediately,
from Yakima, Idaho, Montana, Colorado and elsewhere authoritative voices shouted: "No Japs
wanted here!"
The Japanese feared with reason that, forced
to evacuate their homes, unable to find a place
to stay, they would be kicked from town to town
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in the interior like the "Oakies" of John Steinbeck's
novel. Others went further and envisioned the day
when the inhabitants of inland states, aroused by
the steady influx of Japanese, would refuse to sell
gasoline and food to them. They saw, too, the possibility of mob action against them as exhausted, impoverished and unable to travel further, they stopped
in some town or village where they were not wanted.
(43:101)
Over 270 Japanese people, 1$7 of whom were American
citizens, who lived on Bainbridge Island, wanted and tried to
move voluntarily but were unable to do so.

Their leader, I.

Nagatani, wanted to set up a cooperative colony of evacuated
Japanese in Eastern Washington and Idaho.

They planned to

take over abandoned farms in these areas and would even pay
most of the costs in their moving.

However, the residents

of Eastern Washington and Idaho opposed such a plan and the
idea was dropped.

These Japanese people were helpless for

they could go nowhere voluntarily.

Most of them were straw-

berry growers with their crop valued at $250,000.

Their

plants were just beginning to bud, but they cared for their
crop until that time when they· must move.

It was announced

by the major daily newspapers in this state on March 23 that
Bainbridge Island Japanese could leave voluntarily from
March 23-30, providing their destination was approved by the
Army.

After March JO, they would be sent to the Manzanar

Center in California.

These newspapers also announced that

the evacuees would be paid $50 per month, to be collected
after the war, and charged $15 per person per month for
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food. (31:1)

(The actual pay for those working in the

centers would range from $12 to $19 per month with no charge
for food.)

James Y. Sakamoto, general chairman of the emer-

gency defense council of the Seattle Chapter of the JapaneseAmerican Citizens League, wrote to President Roosevelt on
¥..arch 25, 1942, asking him to

11

point out to our fellow citi-

zens that we are not traitors, 11 (32:16) and asked that some
refuge in the heart of the country be designated for the
evacuees.

He suggested the southern end of Moses Lake in the

Columbia Basin reclamation area be opened for 10,000 Japanese,
but the letter hardly had time to reach the President when
General DeWitt ordered compulsory evacuation two days later.
The entire voluntary evacuation program was terminated
by General DeWitt, with Proclamation No. 4 on Narch 27, 1942,
for two reasons:

(1) to alleviate tension and to prevent

incidents between Japanese evacuees and others; (2) to insure
an orderly, supervised, and controlled evacuation with adequate provision for the protection of evacuees and their
property. (43:105)

The final results of voluntary evacuation

of men, women, and children in Washington State by counties
appears in Table I, page 25.
Compulsory Evacuation
The controversy by this time was not should the evacuation take place, but whether time and practical considerations should be allowed for a study of individual cases
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TABLE I
BREAKDOWN OF VOLUNTARY EVACUEES
IN WASHINGTON STATE (43:110)
County

Total

:Men

Women

Chelan
Clark
King
Kitsap
Lewis
Okanogan
Pacific
Pierce
Thurston
Yakima

2
5
403
6
6

1
2
220
2
5

5
56
6

1
3
183
4
1
3
2
26
2

_]_

_.!±.

_)_

499

229

270

3

0

3

30
4

before evacuation, so that only dangerous individuals would
be evacuated.

Some Americans, such as the American Civil

Liberties Union, asked if it would be constitutional to
remove citizens indiscriminately without due process of law
but Senator Ji.ion C. Wallgren, chairman of the Pacific Coast
Congressional Committee on enemy aliens and sabotage, said
the "War department would have the authority to bar any or
all persons from restricted areas during wartime and it could
be done without raising any constitutional or legal questions.rr
(19:2)

The decision had been made and was to be carried out.
The general plan for the compulsory evacuation and

relocation provided three main steps:

(1) registering and

servicing of evacuees at Civil Control Stations; (2} provisions of temporary residences and a minimum of normal community services at assembly centers; (3) ultimate transfer of
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evacuees to relocation centers under the control of the War
Relocation Authority.

While the initial recommendations for

evacuation on February 14, 1942, contemplated the internment
of only alien Japanese, this was now abandoned by General
DeWitt. (43:43)
follows:

The method of compulsory evacuation was as

First, the coastal strip of the United States was

divided into 108 exclusion areas, 18 of which were in
Washington State.

As each area was ready for evacuation, the

people were notified, with the heads of families and/or each
individual living alone being required to report to Civil
Control Stations for instructions and registration.

Over

$5,000,000 was made available for making loans against evacuee
crops and farm equipment and also to find substitute farm
operators who would take over these farms and equipment.

The

Federal Reserve Bank took the responsibility for personal
property including business property and cars, but the Army
offered to buy any car or truck for the Blue Book value.
Each evacuee was given a health check for contagious diseases
by the United States Public Health Service prior to their
entry in the assembly centers.
The evacuation procedure within the exclusion area
covered a period of seven days.

The Exclusion Order would be

posted throughout the area from noon the first day to 5 a.m.
on the second day.

Registration of all persons of Japanese

ancestry would take place on the second and third days.

The
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processing or preparing of evacuees for evacuation would
take place on the fourth and fifth days.

On the sixth and

seventh days the evacuees were moved. (43:92)

The first

compulsory evacuation on the Pacific Coast was from
Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound directly to Jv.anzanar
Relocation Center in eastern California.

The areas were to

be evacuated as fast as possible in the order of their relative military importance.

The Exclusion Order also stated:

(1) the evacuation would not split family units or communities where this could be avoided; (2) the program should
minimize financial loss to the evacuees; (3) the use of military was to be at a minimum, instead the use of civilian
personnel was recommended; (4) evacuation was to be as quick
as possible and was to make the relocation centers selfsupporting; (5) evacuation was to include an initial move
to assembly centers and then a more permanent move to relocation centers.

(43:77)

The provisions of the Exclusion Order were soon
ignored.

The first provision stated that family units would

not be split, yet Ebaristo Arota, a Filipino, and his wife,
Kiki, a Japanese, were separated when the Bainbridge Island
residents were evacuated.

The Army authorities said "they

were compelled to deny requests that Arota be permitted to
accompany the evacuees or that his wife be allowed to stay
with him. 11 (34:1)

The second provision said that financial
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loss to the evacuees should be minimized, yet at the beginning of the program some evacuees had as little as 48 hours
to sell, rent, loan, store or even give away their real
property and possessions. (1:124)

The evacuees on Bainbridge

Island had only four days to move voluntarily (March 23-27)
and only two days' notice that the
them to California
table.

(Iv~arch

27-29).

govern~ent

would evacuate

Financial loss was inevi-

The third provision said that the use of the military

should be at a minimum, but when the Bainbridge Island
Japanese were moved the soldiers were in charge of the
evacuation.

One soldier who helped with the moving said it

had been both a hard and an easy job, "Easy because the
Japanese cooperated.

Difficult because it was hard to see

the Japanese having to leave their homes.rr (34:2)

The fifth

provision said that the Japanese would first be sent to
assembly centers and then to a more permanent relocation
center, yet the Bainbridge Island Japanese were sent directly
to the Manzanar Relocation Center in California.

In all,

the entire evacuation job was completed by the Army in some
68 days after the first actual removal, and done without
any serious breakdown of operations.
Assembly; Centers
The assembly centers were initially called "induction
centers."

They were being planned at the same time the sites

for the relocation centers were being sought.

The plans
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called for the use of existing facilities:

thus fairgrounds

and race tracks were the primary source of such locations.
Only one site was picked in Washington and that was in
Puyallup near the Western Washington Fairgrounds.

The United

States Engineer Corps were to construct suitable facilities
for housing and feeding families.

Only four weeks were

allowed for completion of the projects with work beginning
on the Puyallup Assembly Center on Karch 28 and being
finished 17 days later.
8,000 persons.

It cost $500,000 and would hold

Stories that were carried in the local papers

described the buildings that would house the evacuees as
being 40 feet by 15 feet and arranged in blocks with each
family having a room (called an apartment) which was 20 feet
by 15 feet.
rooms.

Families with over five members were allowed two

Each room or apartment had a wood stove and steel

cots with mattresses, (36:1) but the residents were to make
or supply their own furniture.
halls. (35:1)

They would eat in mess

The Seattle Japanese were the first to be sent

to Puyallup Center starting on April 28, and they nick-named
it Camp Harmony.
The Western Defense Command hoped to move evacuees to
an assembly center near their homes for the purpose of keeping
the evacuees close by until property matters were settled but
four of the five assembly centers were outside the state.
They also hoped to group the evacuees in a center in a
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similar climatic region, but the Japanese of Washington State
were sent to five different assembly centers, as shown in
Table II.
TABLE II
BREAKDOdN OF EVACUEES TO ASSEMBLY CENTERS (43:290)

Residents

Total

1.

Bainbridge Island

258

2.

Seattle and eastern Pierce County

7,314

3.

King County (excepting Seattle),
Kitsap County, and
western part of
3,497
Pierce County,
including Tacoma

4.

5.

Ckanogan, Chelan,
Kittitas, Yakima,
Benton, Klickitat
Counties
Watcorn, Skagit,
Snohomish, Clallam,
Jefferson, Grays
Harbor, Mason,
Thurston, Pacific,
Lewis, Wahkiakum,
Cowlitz, Skamania,
and Clark Counties

1,165

657

Assembly
Center

Relocation
Center

Vianzanar,
California

Manzanar,
California

Puyallup

Minidoka,
Idaho

Pinedale,
Central
California

Tu.le Iake,
California

Portland,
Oregon

Heart Mountain,
Wyoming

Tule Iake,
Northeastern
California

Tule Lake,
California
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Relocation Centers
In total, ten relocation center sites were chosen with
a majority of them on public lands, such as reclamation projects which the federal government owned.

Each center had

to be able to hold at least 5,000 persons, had to be distant
from any strategic spot, and had to be capable of providing
some of the necessary food.

In the centers the evacuees were

to live in Army-type barracks which were arranged in the
rectangular form found in all Army camps.

'I'he centers resem-

bled both an Indian reservation, in that all the people were
of one racial group, and an internment camp, being completely
surrounded with a wire fence and armed guards. (15:152)

Each

center was to try to provide work for every able person above
16 years of age with most of the jobs being farming but with
limited positions available in the areas such as teaching,
engineering, and other professional-type jobs.

The evacuees'

wage scale was $12 per month for unskilled labor, $16 per
month for skilled work, and $19 per month for professional
and supervisory work.

This wage scale was used even though

the Tolan Committee had recommended that evacuees be paid the
current wages for comparable work outside of the centers.
(24:294)

The adult evacuees also received a clothing

allowance of $3.75 per month while children were given $1.25.
The Japanese in these centers were encouraged to take
and carry out responsibility, and some served as assistants
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to the chief of each center.
with the evacuees.

Policies were also discussed

Each center had a hospital with doctors

and nurses, many of whom were Japanese as was the chief
police officer.

A board of Judicial Review with a majority

of its members being Japanese was set up to try petty cases
in criminal court.

In the centers only the Nisei could hold

elective office, but the Issei could vote in the elections.
The evacuees could leave the centers only for specific
and properly guarded work projects and all centers were
surrounded by barbed wire and were under guard, not only to
keep evacuees in but to keep outsiders out. (15:155)

Resent-

ment grew between the Caucasian staff and the Japanese
inhabitants, especially at the Tule Lake Center.

The

Japanese were confined there, fed and clothed by the government, housed in barracks with one family to one room,and
their children were schooled in the center.

The Caucasian

staff had liberty to come and go, better food in their
dining room, attractive apartments, a higher standard of
living, and could send their children to outside schools.
The transfer from the temporary assembly centers to
the relocation centers was supposed to follow certain prime
objectives:

(1) evacuate entire comrnunities as units;

(2) combine cozr.munities to get a balance between urban and
rural population; (3) minimize change in climatic conditions;

(4) keep the movement of each group to a minimum of
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distance.

(43:94)

These principles were not always followed

in the case of the Japanese from Washington.

The climatic

conditions between Puget Sound and eastern California are
vastly different as are the conditions between eastern
Washington and Portland, Oregon, where the eastern Washington
evacuees were sent.

The principle of keeping travel to a

minimum was also violated when evacuees were sent from
Washington to California, Oregon, Idaho, and Wyoming.

As

was previously mentioned, the Bainbridge Island Japanese were
sent directly to l\'lanzanar Relocation Center in northeastern
California and kept there.

Seattle Japanese and Japanese

from most of the eastern part of Pierce County were sent to
the assembly center in Puyallup and were later sent to Minidoka
Center in Idaho.

The evacuees from Kitsap and the rest of

King county (excluding Seattle) and western Pierce County
(including Tacoma) were sent to the assembly center in
Pinedale, California, and later to a relocation center at
Tule Lake, California. (43:290)

The residents of the counties

west of the Columbia River and east of the Cascades were sent
from Portland to Heart 11i. ountain, Wyoming.

The Japanese from

the remainder of the Western Washington counties were to
remain at Tule Lake in California.
Thus the Japanese from Washington State were sent to
four different relocation centers, but the greatest number
were sent to the kinidoka Relocation Center, which was
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located in Jerome County, Idaho, 25 miles northwest of Twin
Falls.

The center consisted of 33,500 acres of land obtained

from the Bureau of Reclamation and could handle 10,000
evacuees.

The terrain was rolling but the soil was good for

growing potatoes, sugar beets, beans, and peas.

The

~ianzanar

Assembly and Relocation Center was located in Inyo County,
California.

Located some 225 miles north of Los Angeles, it

consisted of 60,000 acres leased fron; the city of Los Angeles,
and since it hadn't been used for over 30 years the arid
climate had turned it back into unproducing desert lands.
The capacity of the center was 10,000 inhabitants.

The

Heart Iii.ountain Relocation Center was located in Park County
in northwestern Wyoming and consisted of 46,000 acres with a
capacity of 11,000 evacuees.

The land had been public

domain and was received from the Department of the Interior
on a temporary transfer.

The suitable crops for the soil

were alfalfa, beans, sugar beets, seed peas, potatoes, soy
beans, and small grains, but since it had only

5~

inches of

rain per year, irrigation was necessary to raise these
crops.

The Tule Lake Assembly and Relocation Center was

located in hodoc County, California, about 35 miles southeast of Klamath Falls, Oregon.

The site was formerly the

bed of a lake and consisted of 7,400 acres of extremely
fertile soil.

The capacity of the center was 16,000

evacuees, but its peak population was 18,789. (43:250-263)
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Since the greatest number of Washington evacuees were
sent to the
discussion.

~inidoka

Relocation Center, it deserves further

Its peak population at any one time was 9,387

residents, but during the entire duration about 13,000
evacuees went through the center.

To try to more fully

Americanize the Issei, the center offered adult education
classes in the evening which began November 1942 and lasted
until September 1945.

The curriculum included English,

American history, American geography, and a current events
study.

About 1,800 evacuees took part in these courses with

over 1,000 taking English.

The Minidoka adult school system

consisted of a supervisor, a regular Civil Service employee
and 15 evacuee teachers who were paid $16 per month.

At

first only college graduates were used, but soon they chose
to move further east on their own and resettle in normal
communities.

This created a problem.

The Nisei were

reluctant to teach their elders and the Issei were embarrassed to be taught by these youngsters.

To solve the prob-

lem, four Caucasian high school teachers and the librarian
taught some adult education classes.

In addition to the

adult education program, two elementary schools were established in the center to take care of the 948 students in
grades one through eight while a high school was set up to
educate the 630 students in grades nine through twelve.

In

both elementary and secondary education the teaching staff
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consisted of Caucasian and Nisei personnel. (10:98)
The farm land at I·dnidoka consisted of about 270
acres of cleared and irrigated soil on which over 2,200,000
pounds of crops were harvested per season.

"Open ditch irri-

gation was something new to most of the ex-northwest people
and even to experienced irrigation experts, the raw sage
brush and a rolling irregular terrain presented problems.u
(10:108)

However, the problems were solved and the farm land

was able to provide a few root crops, like potatoes, for the
other centers.

The 1943 crop, for example, produced 979,770

pounds of potatoes and also yielded many pounds of radishes,
squash, cabbage, onions, tomatoes, and watermelons.
The center maintained a fire department manned by 43
evacuee-firemen and officers with two fire engines plus other
equipment to fight range fires.

~~nidoka

also had its own

maintenance crew made up of 312 evacuee carpenters, electricians, plumbers, boilermen, sanitary engineers, and janitors.
The Internal Security Section served as the Center's police
force with a Caucasian as its chief and an evacuee as its
captain.

Over fifty evacuees served on the police force.

The center was served by three religious groups:

the Roman

Catholic Church, the Federated Christians, and the United
Buddhists.

Evacuee professional personnel including physi-

cians, graduate and student nurses, dentists, pharmacists,
X-ray and laboratory workers served in the center's hospital
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under the supervision of a Caucasian medical officer and
chief nurse. (10:90-114)
The most offensive thing to the Japanese at all the
centers was the fence.
was built (at Iv. . inidoka).

"It was three months before the fence
During that time the residents

felt they were on their honor to follow the rules, and
followed them." (24:302)

In time, the fence was built, as

has been previously mentioned, not only to keep the evacuees
in, but also to keep racists out.

The evacuees at this center

resented several other things such as the evacuation and the
prejudice which produced it; the loss of their property and
jobs; the mockery of American ideals; the Japanese-American
Citizens League, because it didn't resist evacuation; the
broken promises of the federal government which included
promises of no general evacuation, better housing, higher
wages, and protection of property. (24:302)
In January of 1943, the government decided that all
Japanese must declare themselves loyal or disloyal.

All

persons 17 or over were asked, 1Will you swear unqualified
allegiance to the United States of America .

and for-

swear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese
Emperor • . •

?u

(6:572)

Almost 31,000 Japanese-Americans

said yes, while more than 6,000 said no, and another 3,000
refused to answer the question altogether.

Why did these

6,000 Japanese-Americans refuse to swear allegiance to the
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United States?

Four possible reasons are suggested:

(1) as a protest against their wartime treatment; (2) family
loyalty; (3) as security--they felt safe there until the war
was over; (4) as a consequence of administrative confusion.

( 6: 580)

At I•iinidoka the negative responses were very few

because of better conditions such as better constructed
barracks, a friendly adjacent community, good rapport between evacuees and administrators, and the fact that the
registration of the oath had been explained five days before.
When the f'ederal government lifted the restrictions
on Japanese enlisting in the armed forces, about 11,000
Nisei volunteered.

In Hawaii where there was no evacuation,

one out of every three Nisei, or 9,507, ages 18 to 38 volunteered, but on the mainland only one out of fourteen or 1,208
who were eligible volunteered.

A possible reason for the

relatively low number of mainland Nisei volunteers may have
been that they had to volunteer from behind barbed ·wires and
armed guard. (6:580}

In the I<inidoka Center, because of

good administrative explanation and cooperation with the
Issei advisers, about 300 men volunteered.

This represented

25 per cent of the total who volunteered from the entire
West Coast, while Kinidoka housed only seven per cent of the
total West Coast Nisei. (24:308)

These volunteers served

in the 442nd Regimental Combat Team which was called the most
decorated in the war.

General Joseph Stillwell said,

1

~The
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Nisei have bought an awful big chunk of America with their
blood.tr (16:328)

CHAPTER III
CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVACUATION
By the evacuation of the Japanese the United States
risked a blow to its world prestige, but because of the scope
of World War II few persons noticed or protested the mass
evacuation and relocation program that was being carried out.
In Europe Nazi Germany was fighting for the doctrine of
racial superiority; while Japan was fighting for the socalled cause of the colored races struggling against their
white oppressors.

The United States might have built even

greater strength and prestige at home and abroad out of the
diversity of her minority groups, but the opportunity was
completely thwarted.

The mass evacuation policy seemed to

affirm the enemy principles. (5:373)

President Roosevelt had

said, "The principle on which this country was founded and by
which it has always been governed is that Americanism is a
matter of mind and heart; Americanism is not, and never was,
a matter of race or ancestry." (10:6)

Yet, it was he who

signed the order to incarcerate all West Coast Japanese.

On

the other hand, Roosevelt was the object of great pressure
by citizens, Congressmen, and the military as a result of

great national fear of the Japanese warlords who attacked
the United States without warning.

Military leaders, whose

responsibility it was to defend the continental United States,
demanded full powers to adequately protect the country from
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possible internal and external attacks.

Apparently there was

little else for the President to do but sign the order
giving the military leaders the power they needed to protect
the country.

However, the 15,400 German aliens and S,600

Italian aliens in the Puget Sound region were never moved in
a mass evacuation movement, yet the United States was also at
war with Germany and Italy.

The evacuation was called a

military necessity by the military officials, yet not one
resident, Issei or Nisei, had been found guilty of sabotage either in Hawaii or on the mainland.

Because of ties of

race, tradition, culture and customs, the Japanese presented
a strong, tightly-knit racial group to the military authorities.

The racial features of the Japanese marks them off

from the Caucasian majority in the United States.

Even

though they were born and reared in the United States and
became .Americans on the inside, they were still Orientals on
the outside and thus identified with the enemies of the
United States. (15:146)

Thus not only the 41,000 Japanese

aliens were evacuated from the entire West Coast, but also
the 71,000 Nisei who were citizens. (9:69)

The overzealous-

ness of the military to move all Japanese went so far as to
affect all Japanese aliens, Nisei, all persons who were even
a quarter Japanese, Caucasians married to Japanese, and
Eskimos from Alaska who had a Japanese grandparent. (24:276)
Not only did the Japanese suffer greatly, but the nation lost
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the productivity that reduced its war potential. (1:132)

It

was estimated that in 1942 the Japanese worked about 56 per
cent of all agricultural land in King County and about 39 per
cent in Pierce County. (29:1)

In addition, for almost the

entire year of 1942 at least 50,000 Japanese on the West
Coast who had been employed were now idle and many man hours
of labor were lost.

Finally, the cost to the federal govern-

ment of the mass evacuation program for only the first nine
months was a staggering figure listed by the Army as
$88,676,716.69.

This amount included the construction of

the assembly and relocation centers and the operation of the
federal agencies such as the Farm 'Security Administration, the
Federal Security Agency, and the Federal Works Agency, which
were used to help the evacuees. (43:401)
Even after the evacuees had been relocated, some
Americans accused the War Relocation Authority of "pampering
and coddling" the evacuees, but the WRA would point out some
of the following things.
1.

The maximum for food cost per day for evacuees
was 45 cents per person.

2.

The evacuees lived in only one room barracks
with families of six or more having two rooms.
The rooms were furnished with steel cots and
bedding and nothing else.

4.

Evacuees received low wages--$12-$19 per month-for work performed at the centers. (10:5)

In addition, during the four years of internment, some
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Americans had real apprehensions and misgivings about the
evacuees after their evacuation.

As one motion picture

executive told a WRA staff member, "There must be something
seriously wrong with those people or the Army wouldn't have
"em all under wraps.

That's all I need to know." (42:14)

On

the other hand some Americans did take the time to question
and voice their complaints on the indiscriminate evacuation
of the Japanese.

Professor J. F. Steiner, chairman of the

sociology department at the University of Washington, agreed
that enemy aliens who lived near defense plants and military
establishments should be moved.
But when this plan of evacuation is enlarged to include citizens as well as aliens on the ground that
American-born Japanese are inherently disloyal to
this country, we are starting in motion a dangerous
mass movement growing out of war hysteria and differing little from the treatment of minorities by
the totalitarian governments in Europe and Asia.
(5:192)
For the evacuees, their removal and return brought
about various consequences:

the damage suffered to their

status in the community, to their security and self-esteem,
to their ability to earn, to their economic resources, (1:124)
and to their family organization.

Officials estimate that

the Japanese evacuees were forced to leave behind some 200
million dollars worth of real, personal, and commercial
property.

The average yearly loss for farmers and nursery

men was $13,960 per family, business families suffered an
average loss of $12,SlO, while families who worked for wages
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lost an average of $7,350. (26:117)

While evacuees were

incarcerated, they received a wage for their work which
ranged from $12 to $19 per month which did not compare with
the wages military personnel received, which were notoriously
low at that time.

In addition the military personnel had

pensions, benefits, and opportunities unavailable to the
evacuees.

In fact the compensations paid could only be

compared to that paid in prisons.

The family organization

of the Japanese had also suffered by life in the relocation
camps.

No longer did families cook and eat as a typical

family group, but now ate in cafeterias on diets that consisted mainly of western food.

In addition the Japanese

experienced great damage to their status in the community
when local papers appeared with the following page one headlines:

nMore Japs Must Leave,n flStart Jap Camp in Valley,"

and "Japs Must Evacuate County.fl

These headlines concerning

resident Issei and Nisei appeared on the same front pages
that told of the Japs capturing Singapore or the Japs sinking
an American ship--the word "Japs" in these stories described
the war making machine of Japan. (28:-)
At the relocation centers the evacuees heard rumors
based on stories that appeared in newspapers that many of
their former communities didn't want them back.

News stories

and headlines in local Washington papers such as "Race
Mongers Oppose Nisei,n only supported these rumors.

Dillon
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S. Myer, national director of WRA, said at a Seattle luncheon
that "professional race Mongers and special economic groups
were stirring up hatred in the interests of their own pocketbooks to keep Japanese-Americans from returning to the West
Coast.n (21:3)

At the same luncheon C. W. Doyle, executive

director of the Central Labor Council, took exception to
Myer's statement and said he felt that the armed forces
should be returned before the "Japstt are allowed to come back.
He said:
I have my Grandfather's discharge papers from the
Civil War. I guess I'm an American. But I am
unalterably opposed to the return of the Japs at
this particular time and the majority of the 200,000
people in our council feel the same way. I've
talked to soldiers, sailors, and they want to know
how we can let the Japs come back here at this
time. We better make some provision for our boys'
return from the armed forces instead of debating
the issue. (21: 3)
Myer quickly answered this by telling Doyle:
I repeat, the decision to allow the return of
people of Japanese ancestry was the military's,
not ours • • • I hope you told them (soldiers and
sailors) that you were talking about Americans,
not Japs as you call them. I hope you told them,
if they have not been overseas, that there are
17,600 boys of Japanese ancestry fighting in the
armed forces. I'm not worried about the boys at
Iwo Jima and in Italy. They've seen boys of
Japanese ancestry spill their blood and they think
they are fighting for the American way. (21:3)
Senator Warren G. Magnuson of Washington State in April 1945
felt that all evacuees should be given loyalty tests before
being released from the centers.

He said:

"It is time every
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Japanese-American stand up and be counted.

This country has

no place either in war or peace for anyone of questioned or
questionable loyalty." (22:13)

He also said certain Japanese

aliens and Nisei should be subject to quick deportation if
they didn't swear allegiance to the United States:
Japanese aliens not deported promptly should be
held subject to deportation on the first evidence
of sympathy toward Japan, or unfriendliness to this
country, deportation to be consummated without involved and prolonged bureau procedures.
Persons of Japanese ancestry born in America
should also be subject to deportation unless they
attest to their loyalty to the United States • • • •
Events have proved many Japanese although born
in the United States have considered their real
allegiance is to Japan. (22:13)
This declaration of Senator Magnuson's raises an
interesting point.

Is it legal to deport an American-born

citizen of the United States to the ancestrial homeland of
his father?

In the past history of our country aliens and

naturalized citizens of the United States have been deported
after due process of law to their former homeland, but the
only course for native born citizens after due process of
law would be confinement in•prison for a period of years.
When the return of the evacuees appeared imminent in
April 1945, 700 persons met at Overlake Grade School in
Bellevue to plan a welcome for the loyal Nisei.

Of course,

the anti-Japanese groups were there with George Westbea of
Auburn and C. Nifty Garrett of Sumner representing the
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nRemember Pearl Harbor League, 11 but the majority of the
people at the meeting were for the return of the loyal
evacuees.

The three leaders of this meeting were Linden

Mander, University of Washington political science professor
and member of Mayor Devin's Civic Unity Committee; John L.
Fournier, Kent newspaper publisher; and the Rev. Frank Blish
of Kirkland.

Professor Mander told the group that "strong

evidence that agitation against minority groups in some
Seattle defense plants has been inspired by professional
saboteurs.n (20:1}

However, after the war when all evacuees

were released, only about one half of the Japanese moved back
to their homes on the west coast, the rest remained near the
relocation camps or moved to new areas of the country.

In

March 1946, 52,000 had settled elsewhere and about 57,000
evacuees were back on the Pacific Coast.

In Washington

State, according to the 1950 census, there were only 9,694
Japanese as compared with the 14,560 in 1940.

Most of the

Japanese (7,573} continued to live on the west side of the
Cascades and only 1,764 in eastern Washington with Spokane
county having 1,171 of the latter total.
The readjustment of these Japanese to their former
communities after the war was helped by the lack of segregation in the public schools.

However, much of their social

activity was carried on entirely within Nisei and Issei
groups.

The prejudice that was evident in the early part of
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the war again was present in 1945.

The Native Sons of the

Golden West, an anti-Oriental group in California, the
Remember Pearl Harbor League, the Los Angeles Examiner, and
the San Francisco Examiner all spoke against the return of
the Japanese to the coastal areas.

The Remember Pearl Harbor

League distributed signs to businesses in Washington State-signs that read, "No Japs," and "We Want No Japs Back Here,
Ever."

In some Pacific Coast cities the burial of Nisei

soldiers was refused in their city cemetaries.

In other

areas, including Seattle and Tacoma, restrictive housing
agreements to prohibit persons of Japanese ancestry from
moving into specified districts were still in effect, even
though the Supreme Court ruled that the law couldn't be used
to enforce such agreements.

It should be noted that not

all evacuees experienced prejudice after the war.

Yanosuke

Takao, a gas truck driver before the evacuation, left the
Tule Lake Center in 1945 for Idaho and worked in an orchard.
There he felt no intolerance; however, he didn't tell his
employer that he came from the Tule Lake Center because he
was afraid of the reputation that the center had for being
where a majority of the so-called disloyal evacuees were
kept. (JS:-)

Another evacuee, Shuichi Fukui, returned to

Tacoma and started buying and then selling rice to returned
evacuees and later opened a grocery store.

Because he dealt

mostly with Orientals he felt little or no discrimination upon
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his return.

Fukui not only went through the evacuation as a

citizen of the United States and a veteran of World War I,
but also lost one of his sons in action with the U.

s.

Army

at Okinawa and another son while in the U. S. Army during
the war. (4:-)

The only case of discrimination that Jack

and Sarah Sugimoto noted after their return to Tacoma was in

1946 when Mrs. Sugimoto sought the services of a doctor.
Seventeen days after the birth of a child, Mrs. Sugimoto
developed an ulcerated tooth and made an appointment by phone
with a receptionist for a local doctor.

Upon arriving at the

doctor's office, she was told that the "doctor didn't feel
like working on a Japanese because he had fought in the South
Pacific.n (27:-)

Had the doctor questioned Mrs. Sugimoto

he would have found out that she was a native born citizen of
the United States.
Several cases involving Japanese were taken to court.
Such a case involved the Miyoshi family of Vashon Island,
Washington.

They owned a well-insured home and stored all

their personal belongings in it until after the war.

When

they were evacuated, the insurance company cancelled their
policy and no other company would insure them even though two
of the brothers had served in the army.

On February 1, 1945,

when the family was allowed to return, the home was burned
to the ground with the loss of all their personal belongings.
The arsonists were caught, tried, sentenced, and were

J ' .?, q ~) ~~ ')
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compelled to make partial restitution. (24:2$7)

In 1943

the Supreme Court heard a case involving Gordon Hirabayashi,
a senior at the University of Washington.

Hirabayashi was

convicted in district court for failing to report for evacuation and for violating the curfew, and was sentenced to three
months in jail on each count with all sentences running concurrently.

Hirabayashi said that if he registered he would

be "giving helpless consent to the denial of all things which
give me the incentive to live.

I must maintain my Christian

principles and I consider it my duty to maintain the democratic ideals for which this nation stands. 11 (37:1)

The

American Civil Liberties Union supported Hirabayashi's stand
because "grave questions of constitutional rights are
involved in the application of this order to .American citizens without any inquiry into their loyalty." (37:1)

The

Supreme Court upheld the violation of the curfew and its
legality, but ''Chief Justice Stone emphasized that nothing
was decided regarding the constitutionality of the evacuation." (11:3)

In another appeal case involving Fred

Toyosaburo Korematsu, who had refused to obey the exclusion
orders and had been found guilty in District Court, the
United States Supreme Court upheld the wartime exclusion
orders in a six to three decision with Justices Roberts,
Murphy, and Jackson dissenting.
by Justice Black said:

The majority represented
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Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens
from their homes except under circumstances of
direct emergency and peril, is inconsistent with
our basic governmental institutions. But when
under conditions of modern warfare our shores
arre [SiiJ threatened by hostile forces, the
power to protect must be commensurate with the
threatened danger • • • •
• • • We cannot by availing ourselves of the
calm perspective of hindsight--now say that at
that time these actions were unjustified. (14:2)
On the other hand, Justice Jackson's dissenting opion is
frequently quoted by constitutional lawyers.

He said in part:

But here is an attempt to make an otherwise innocent act a crime merely because this prisoner is
the son of parents as to whom he had no choice and
belongs to a race from which there is no way to
resign. If Congress in peacetime should enact
such a criminal law, I should suppose this Court
would refuse to enforce it • • • •
• • • Much is said of the danger to liberty from
the Army program for deporting and detaining these
citizens of Japanese extraction. But a judicial
construction of due process clause that will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to
liberty than the promulgation of the order itself.
A military order, however unconstitutional, is not
apt to last longer than the military emergency.
Even during that period a succeeding commander may
revoke it all.
But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such
an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution or rather rationalizes the Constitution to
show that the Constitution sanctions such an order,
the Court for all time has validated the principle
of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and
of transplanting American citizens.
I should hold that a civil court cannot be made to
enforce an order which violates constitutional limitations even if it is a reasonable exercise of military authority. The courts can exercise only the
judicial power, can apply only the law, and
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must abide by the Constitution, or they cease to be
courts and become instruments of military power ••

tt

(14:4)

Justice Murphy also noted that the curfew order nbears a
melancholy resemblance to the treatment accorded to members
of the Jewish race in Germany and in other parts of Europe."

(3:252)
While the Hirabayashi and Korematsu cases involved
only individual appeals to the Supreme Court, it may be asked
why didn't the Nisei, through such an organization as the
Japanese-American Citizens League bring legal action against
the mass evacuation and relocation program?

First of all the

leadership of such organizations as the JACL and similar
groups had been detained at the out-break of the war by the
FBI, thus providing a period of time for these groups with no
leadership available.

Secondly, the Nisei felt that to bring

such a case to court would reflect on their loyalty at a
crucial time for the country and for their future as was
pointed out in a book published by the evacuees at Minidoka:
We did not wish to test the legality of restraints
on our freedom. We believed that the obedient, quiet
cooperation with the government's plan would indicate the genuineness of our loyalty and should be
accepted as our contribution and sacrifice to the
war effort. Of more importance is the realization
of the government and its people that the evacuation
was a mistake from a standpoint of humanity if not
from a standpoint of constitutionality. (10:5)
However, the Nisei, who were by birth citizens of the United
States were denied due process of law in that no formal
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charges were ever brought against them, no trial was held, no
jury sat in judgment, and no witnesses were called to prove
any charges against them.

The Japanese-Americans were the

immediate victims of the evacuation, but "larger consequences
are carried by the American people as a whole.

Their legacy

is the lasting one of precedent and constitutional sanctity
for a policy of mass incarceration under military auspices.
This is the most important result of the process by which the
evacuation decision was made.
Americans." (5:374}

That process betrayed all

Eugene V. Rostow, professor of law at

Yale, judged the evacuation on legal grounds and said it was
"our worst wartime mistake.

Its motivation and its impact

on our system of law deny every value of democracy." (24:290}
"The immediate goal of the evacuation was presumably
clear cut:

Protection of the West Coast as a war measure.

But the national government, in addition to winning the war
abroad, had an equal responsibility for maintaining democracy
at home." (5:372}

The evacuation violated the fundamental

liberties of Americans and has continued a dangerous
precedent from the American Civil War that military necessity
may override the civil rights of all Americans.
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